Would a rational underage binge-drink? by Levy, Amnon
University of Wollongong
Research Online
Faculty of Business - Economics Working Papers Faculty of Business
2013
Would a rational underage binge-drink?
Amnon Levy
University of Wollongong
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library:
research-pubs@uow.edu.au
Recommended Citation














Would a rational underage binge-drink? 
 
Amnon Levy 
School of Economics 
University of Wollongong 

















School of Economics 
University of Wollongong 









This paper provides a utility-based definition of binge drinking and examines the 
compatibility of this phenomenon with rational decision making. Prohibition of young 
people’s consumption of alcohol is frequently violated with binge-drinking in groups. The 
analysis considers the roles of peer-pressure, full price of alcohol and crowding in underage 
group-drinking sessions and identifies the conditions for binge-drinking by expected utility 
maximizing members. Rational binge-drinking occurs when the impact of the peer-pressure 
on the individual member’s utility exceeds the loss of utility from the forgone spending on all 
other goods associated with the expected full marginal cost of consuming alcohol. 
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The optimal level of public investment in controlling the prevalence of alcohol consumption 
is linked to the choice between prohibition and accommodation. Tragler et al. (2001) and 
Levy et al. (2006) have demonstrated that the likely non-concavity of the public planner’s 
optimal control problem’s Hamiltonian in the prevalence of consumption of an intoxicating 
substance gives rise to unstable steady states. It also implies the existence of a threshold 
number of consumers beyond which accommodation and permitting convergence to the high-
prevalence and low-control steady state along the only stable manifold is socially optimal. 
Prohibition of alcohol had been decreed in several countries during the early part of the 
twentieth century, including the United States (1920-1933). In view of the very large initial 
number of alcohol consumers and the aforementioned threshold-based argument, prohibition 
was not socially optimal in the United States. It became less desirable as bootlegging and 
organised crime had taken control of the supply of alcohol. Consequently, the prohibition was 
replaced by accommodation, but with a minimum-age restriction.  
Age restrictions tend to lead to formation of groups that facilitate their violation by 
the affected individuals. The focus of the theoretical analysis presented in this paper is on the 
possible link between underage binge-drinking and participation in group-drinking session. In 
particular, the analysis considers aspects of affiliation to a group of alcohol consumers that 
are relevant to the investigation of whether binge-drinking can be an outcome of an 
individual member’s decision making that is oriented to maximize her/his expected utility. 
On the one hand, affiliation to a drinking group moderates the personal price of alcohol for 
the underage individual members. In addition to the acquisition cost, the personal price of 
alcohol includes the moral costs of breaking the law and the costs of risk bearing of 
involvement in accident and violent exchange. Naturally, the larger the group, the greater is 
its bargaining power as well as its ability to provide moral support, care and protection to 
members. Namely, the size of the group lowers the personal price of alcohol and, ceteris 
paribus, the increases the quantity of alcohol demanded by the members. Yet, as 
demonstrated in the ensuing sections, the moderating effect of group on personal price cannot 
by itself prove binge drinking to be rational in the said von Neumann-Morgenstern sense. The 
individual member’s level of alcohol consumption might be further intensified by peers’ 
expectations of displaying good drinking companionship. Our analysis demonstrates the 
crucial role of the individual utility’s sensitivity to such peer pressure in rendering binge-
drinking as a possible rational choice. On the other hand, an income effect should be taken 
into account. Due to intoxication there can be a negative relationship between earning and 
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alcohol consumption. In addition, crowding increases the probability of being noticed by law-
enforcers and, consequently, fined.  
To set the stage to the analysis of the group’s overall effect on rational members’ 
consumption of alcohol, sections 2 and 3 firstly consider the case of solitary drinkers—
individuals whose utility is not affected by externalities generated by shared drinking 
sessions—in a society free of age restrictions on alcohol consumption. Section 2 offers a 
formulation of the utility from alcohol and, subsequently, a utility-based definition of binge 
drinking. Section 3 provides a relationship between earnings and consumption of alcohol and, 
consequently, the budget for all other goods. It shows that, at any age, binge-drinking is not 
optimal for lone rational drinkers. Section 4 formulates the effects of minimum-age 
restriction and participating in underage group-drinking sessions on members’ expected 
utilities. Subsequently, it identifies the conditions for rational binge-drinking. 
 
2. Utility-based definition of binge drinking  
To provide a utility-based definition of binge-drinking let us consider a setting where the 
individual’s utility from consuming alcohol is not tainted by external effects; namely, 
drinking in solitary. The formulation of utility from consuming alcohol in solitary at any 
given age is based on the following assumptions. A week is the relevant unit of time as it is 
neither too short, nor too long, for accounting the individual’s cycle of drinking, work, study 
and consumption of other goods and services. The individual’s weekly cycle commences 
with drinking in a private session that starts on Saturday night and finishes by early Sunday 
morning. During the rest of the week the individual refrains from consuming alcohol (due to 
work, care and/or study duties). By the next Saturday night the individual is fully recovered 
from the adverse effects of alcohol.  
The individual’s alcohol consumption in the weekly session at t years of age ( tc ) has 
an age-dependent tolerance upper-bound ( tc ), which indicates her/his incapacitating intake at 
that particular age. Reaching this tolerance upper-bound nullifies the individual’s 
productivity and, in turn, income and spending on goods services during the following seven 
days. The consumption of alcohol might also directly decrease the individual’s utility from 
some goods and services and increase the utility from others. As the aggregate direct effect is 
not clear, and for simplicity, overall neutrality is assumed and displayed by separability 
between the utility from alcohol and the utility from all other goods and services. That is, at 
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any age t, the individual’s (overall) weekly utility ( tu ) is equal to the sum of the weekly 
utility from alcohol ( atu ) and the weekly utility from all other goods and services (
g
tu ):  
a g
t t tu u u= + .            (1) 
The weekly utility from alcohol is taken to be equal to the difference between the 
pleasure from drinking and the discomfort associated with alcohol intoxication (impaired 
balance, loss of muscle coordination, drowsiness, nausea, etc.). At sufficiently low levels of 
consumption, the t-year old individual’s marginal pleasure from drinking exceeds the 
marginal discomfort. But while the marginal pleasure diminishes with the quantity of alcohol 
consumed, the marginal discomfort is increasing and eventually becomes dominant. At the 
consumption level tĉ  within the physiologically feasible range t(0, c )  the marginal 
discomfort is equal to the marginal pleasure, rendering the marginal weekly utility from 
alcohol to be zero. This property can be captured by the following polynomial: 
a 2
t t t t tu c c= α −β                       (2) 
where the age-dependent coefficients are such that t t 0α > β > . This specification can be 
viewed as a second-order approximation of a general, single-peaked, function of weekly 
utility from alcohol: a a a a 2t t t t t t tu (c ) u (0) u (0)c 0.5u (0)c′ ′′+ +  with 
a
tu (0) 0= , 
a
tu (0) 0′α = >  
and at0.5u (0) 0.′′−β = <  As 
a
t tˆu (c ) 0′ = , t t tĉ / 2= α β  and, consequently, t t tˆ0.5 / cβ = α . In 
turn, Eq. (2) can be expressed as:  
a 2
t t t t tˆu [c 0.5(c / c )]= α − .           (3) 
Since atu 0><′  as t tˆc c<>  then, from the perspective of generating weekly utility from 
alcohol per se, tĉ  is the individual’s bliss intake of alcohol in a weekly drinking session at t-
years of age. Consumption of alcohol beyond tĉ  is excessive and represents binge drinking. 
In contrast to the rule of thumb that regards consumption beyond four shots, in the case of 
females, and five shots, in the case of males, as binge drinking (Courtney and Polich, 2009), 
this proposed definition is sensitive to individual variations. The intensity of binge drinking 
can be measured by t t t tˆ ˆ[(c c ) / (c c )] (0,1)− − ∈  for any t t tˆc (c , c )∈ . 
 
3. Income effect and solitary consumption of alcohol in the absence of age restrictions   
The consumption of alcohol reduces productivity and, consequently, the budget available for 
buying goods. We take all other goods as an aggregate and let p 0>  denote the relative price 
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of alcohol and tI  the individual’s weekly income, or performance-based budget allocated by 
parents in the case of non-working adolescents. We assume that the individual’s marginal 
weekly utility from spending on all other goods ( t tI pc− ) is constant, but can be age 
dependent ( t 0γ > ). We further assume that the individual’s current weekly income declines 
from an alcohol-free age-dependent level ftI  proportionally to the individual’s degree of 
incapacitation by alcohol, i.e., ft t t tI (1 c / c )I= − . Hence, the individual weekly utility from all 
the other (non-alcoholic) goods is: 
g f
t t t t t tu [(1 c / c )I pc ]= γ − − .          (4) 
Recalling (1), (3) and (4), the weekly utility of a solitary consumer of alcohol is: 
2 f
t t t t t t t t t tˆu [c 0.5(c / c )] [(1 c / c )I pc ]= α − + γ − − .         (5) 
We postulate that a rational t-year old solitary person sets tc  to maximize her/his weekly 
utility. The first-order condition for maximum weekly utility is: 
*
ft
t t t t t t
t
cu [p (1/ c )I ] 0
ĉ
′ = α −α − γ + = .         (6) 
As the second-order condition is satisfied ( tˆ/ c 0−α < ), the optimal weekly alcohol 





I ˆc 1 p c
c
  γ
= − +  α   
.          (7) 
 
Proposition 1. A rational person who drinks alone does not binge.  
 
Proof: From equation (7), *t tˆc c≤  as 
f
t tp I / c 0+ ≥ .  
 
At any age, the individual’s utility maximizing consumption of alcohol in solitary is lower 
than her/his current age bliss intake by a proportion that is equal to the product of the full 
price of alcohol ft t[p (I / c )]+  and the relative marginal utility from all other goods t t( / )γ α . 
Even when alcohol is freely available, a rational person drinks in solitary less than tĉ  as long 
as drinking has an adverse effect on her/his earning ability.   
 
4. Minimum-age restriction, group influence and alcohol consumption  
The analysis presented in the previous section suggests that rational young people do not 
binge-drink in solitary. It is demonstrated in this section that this outcome does not 
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necessarily prevail when they face a minimum-age restriction and, as frequently observed, 
drink in groups. The present section incorporates the effects of minimum-age restriction and 
groups into the formulation of the expected utility function of underage consumers of alcohol 
and identifies the conditions for rational underage people to binge-drink.  
As in the previous section, a weekly cycle is considered with a drinking session that 
starts on Saturday night and finishes on early Sunday morning and, therefore, affects the 
participants during the following seven days. But now the drinking session is shared with 
similarly under-aged companions and the participants are facing a risk of being noticed by 
law-enforcers and, subsequently, punished. In addition to the direct satisfaction from 
consuming alcohol, a person who participates in a group drinking session can gain (loose) 
utility from increased (diminished) reputation of being an invaluable drinking companion 
proportionally to the product of the deviation of her/his alcohol consumption from an 
expected minimum norm, etc 0> , and the relative size of the group of the rest the drinking-
session’s members: 
e
t t t t t tR r ((n 1) / n )(c c )= − −            (8) 
where tr 0≥  is an age-dependent coefficient, tn  is the largest possible group of affiliation for 
the underage under consideration, and tn  is a predetermined number of the drinking-
session’s members. In this specification, tn 1−  indicates the number of drinkers 
accompanying the individual under consideration, t t0 (n 1) / n 1≤ − <  indicates the intensity 
of peer pressure and tr  the sensitivity of the individual’s weekly utility to peer pressure.   
There are other disadvantages and advantages from drinking in group. On the one 
hand, the probability of being noticed by law enforcers and, in turn, punished, increases with 
crowding—namely, the number of companions. With t0 1< ϕ <  denoting the probability of 
being noticed by law-enforcers for the largest possible group of t-year old underage drinkers, 
the probability of being noticed for a t-year old underage drinker in a group of t tn n≤  is 
t t t(n / n )ϕ . Since similarity to eligible-age consumers increases with age, it is possible that 
tϕ  diminishes as t converges to the minimum age. The punishment for drinking is assumed to 
be a fine that is proportional to the level of alcohol consumption: t tcµ , where t 0µ ≥  is an 
age-dependent fine per unit of alcohol. The underage alcohol consumer expects a portion 
t0 1≤ ε ≤  of the fine to be borne by her/his parents, depending on their degree of leniency.   
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On the other hand, affiliation to a group reduces the personal price of alcohol for the 
underage individual consumer. The larger the group, the greater are its bargaining, 
supportive, caring and protecting capabilities. We assume that the personal price of alcohol 
for a group member is  st t t t[1 (n / n )]p−θ , where 
s
tp  is the personal price of alcohol for a lone 
t-year old person facing age restrictions and t0 1< θ < . Due to limited access to alcohol, 
s
tp p> . Yet it is possible that
s
tp  decreases and tθ  increases with t. 
In view of these assumptions and Eq. (5), the distribution of the underage consumer’s 
weekly utility is: 
2 e f s
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
t
2 e f s
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
ˆ[c 0.5(c / c )] r ((n 1) / n )(c c ) {(1 c / c )I [1 (n / n )]p c (1 ) c } (n ) / (n )
u
ˆ[c 0.5(c / c )] r ((n 1) / n )(c c ) {(1 c / c )I [1 (n / n )]p c } 1 (n ) / n )
α − + − − + γ − − −θ − − ε µ ϕ

= 
α − + − − + γ − − −θ −ϕ
   (9) 
and her/his expected weekly utility is: 
2 e
t t t t t t t t t t
f s
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
ˆE(u ) [c 0.5(c / c )] r ((n 1) / n )(c c )
{(1 c / c )I [1 (n / n )]p c } (n / n ) (1 ) c
= α − + − −
+ γ − − −θ −ϕ γ − ε µ

                  .(10)    
A rational, in the von Neumann-Morgenstern sense, underage person chooses an 
alcohol intake in the weekly group-drinking session that maximizes her/his expected weekly 
utility. As tE(u )  is concave in tc , that underage’s optimal alcohol consumption must satisfy 
the following necessary condition:          
o f s
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t tˆ[1 (c / c )] r ((n 1) / n ) ( / c )I [1 (n / n )]p (n / n )(1 ) 0α − + − − γ − γ −θ −ϕ − ε µ = . (11) 
Consequently, 
s s f
o t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
t t
t
[r (n 1) / n ) p (1 ) ](n / n ) [p (I / c )] ˆc 1 c
 − + γ θ −ϕ γ − ε µ − γ +
= + α 
.                  (12) 
As indicated earlier, the size of the drinking group is taken to be exogenous: namely, the 
underage person under consideration neither has the power to form her/his own group, nor 
the opportunity to select one from a set of groups with variable size. Of course, a rational 
person joins an existing group of tn 1 0− >  veteran members, or quit her group of tn 1>  
members, if, and only if, o ot t t t t tE(u (c (n 1))) E(u (c (n 1)))> − =   is larger, or smaller, than zero, 





o o o e
t t t t t t t t t t t t
f
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
s o
t t t t t t t t t t t t
s
t t t t t t
E(u (c (n 1))) E(u (c (n 1))) r [(n 1) / n )][c (n 1) c ]
ˆ[ I / c ]{[r (n 1) / n (1 ) ]((n 1) / n )} / c
{[1 (n / n )]p (n / n )(1 ) }c (n 1)
{[1 (1/ n )]p (1/ n )
> − = = − > −
+ α − γ − −ϕ γ − ε µ − α
− γ −θ +ϕ − ε µ >
+ γ −θ +ϕ
 
o
t t t t
o 2 o 2
t t t t t t
(1 ) }c (n 1)
ˆ(0.5 / c )[c (n 1) c (n 1) ]
− ε µ =
− α > − =
               (13) 
where ot tc (n 1)>  is given by (12) and  
s s f
o t t t t t t t t t t t t
t t
t
[ p (1 ) ](1/ n ) [p (I / c )] ˆc (n 1) 1 c
 γ θ −ϕ γ − ε µ − γ +
= = + α 
.              (14) 
 
Proposition 2  
i. If tr  is greater (smaller) than 
s
t t t t t t[ (1 ) p ]γ ϕ − ε µ −θ , then a rational underage person 
consumes a larger (smaller) quantity of alcohol in group-drinking sessions than in seclusion. 
(Straightforward from comparing the right-hand side of equation (12) when tn 1>  to that 
when tn 1= .) 
ii. If s ft t t t t t t t t t t t t t tr ((n 1) / n ) { (n / n )(1 ) [(1 (n / n ))p (I / c )]}− > γ ϕ − ε µ + −θ + , then a rational 




Rational binge-drinking presents a strong cognitive obstacle to overcome alcoholism. The 
analysis considers aspects of affiliation to a group of alcohol consumers that are relevant to 
the investigation of whether binge-drinking can be an outcome of an individual member’s 
decision making that is oriented to maximize her/his expected utility. The first part of 
Proposition 2 reveals that switching from solitary drinking to drinking in company does not 
necessarily increase the alcohol consumption of a rational underage person. Her/his alcohol 
consumption can be reduced by participating in group-drinking sessions if the sensitivity of 
her/his utility to peer pressure is smaller than the difference between the forgone utility from 
spending on other goods associated with the intensifying marginal effect of crowding on the 
expected self-financed fine and the utility gains from spending on other goods associated 
with the moderating marginal effect of the group’s bargaining power on the price of alcohol.  
The second part of Proposition 2 says that, unlike rational consumption of alcohol in 
solitary, rational consumption of alcohol in company can exceed the personal bliss level. As
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t0 1< θ <  and t t0 n / n 1,< ≤  
s f
t t t t t t t t t t t(n / n )(1 ) {[1 (n / n )]p (I / c )} 0.ϕ − ε µ + −θ + >  That is, 
the moderating effect of the bargaining power of the group cannot by itself lead rational 
members of a drinking session to binge-drink. Rational binge-drinking occurs when the 
impact of the peer-pressure on the individual’s weekly utility exceeds the loss of utility from 
the forgone spending on all other goods associated with the expected full marginal cost of 
alcohol which, in addition to the full price in the absence of age restrictions, includes the self-
financed portion of the marginal expected fine. Peer-pressure, compounded by sensitivity of 
the individual’s weekly utility to such a pressure, and sufficiently low marginal utility from 
spending on all other goods are essential for underage binge-drinking to be rational. The 
critical sensitivity ( tr ) to peer pressure required for rational binge-drinking to take place 
decreases with the expected portion of the fine to be borne by the parents ( tε ), the 
moderating effect of the group’s bargaining power on the purchasing price of alcohol ( tθ ) 
and the individual’s tolerance to alcohol ( tc ), and increases with the probability of being 
noticed by law-enforcers ( t t t(n / n )ϕ ), the ratio of the fine to the intake of alcohol ( tµ ), the 
alcohol-free (potential) weekly earning ( ftI ), and the marginal weekly utility from all other 
goods ( tγ ).  
There may be a positive relationship between sensitivity to peer pressure and age 
during adolescence. The underlying rationale is that being initially responsive to parents’ 
and/or educators’ expectations, adolescents may become more and more sensitive to friends’ 
expectations at the passage of years. The existence of such a relationship can be manifested 
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t t t t t t t t t
f s o
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t n
o 2
t t n
E(u (c (n 1))) [ I r ((n 1) / n )c ]
{ r ((n 1) / n ) I / c [1 (n / n )]p (n / n )(1 ) }c
ˆ(0.5 / c )c
> = γ − −





o f f s o
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t 1
o2
t t 1
E(u (c (n 1))) I { I / c [1 (1/ n )]p (1/ n )(1 ) }c
ˆ(0.5 / c )c .






t t t t t t t t t t
f s o
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t n
f s o
t t t t t t t t t t t t t 1
o 2 o2
t t n 1
E(u (c (n 1))) E(u (c (n 1))) r ((n 1) / n )c
{ r ((n 1) / n ) I / c [1 (n / n )]p (n / n )(1 ) }c
{ I / c [1 (1/ n )]p (1/ n )(1 ) }c
ˆ(0.5 / c )[c c ]
> − = = − −
+ α + − − γ − γ −θ − γ ϕ − ε µ





By collecting terms 
o o o e
t t t t t t t t t n t
f o o
t t t t n 1
s o
t t t t t t t t t t n
s o
t t t t t t t t 1
o 2 o2
t t n 1
E(u (c (n 1))) E(u (c (n 1))) r [(n 1) / n )](c c )
[ I / c ](c c )
{[1 (n / n )]p (n / n )(1 ) }c
{[1 (1/ n )]p (1/ n )(1 ) }c
ˆ(0.5 / c )[c c ].
> − = = − −
+ α − γ −
−γ −θ +ϕ − ε µ






o t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
t t t
t
[r (n 1) / n p (1 ) ](n / n ) [p (I / c )] ˆc (n 1) 1 c
 − + γ θ −ϕ γ − ε µ − γ +




o t t t t t t t t t t t t
t t
t
[ p (1 ) ](1/ n ) [p (I / c )] ˆc (n 1) 1 c
 γ θ −ϕ γ − ε µ − γ +
= = + α 
. 
Hence, 
o o t t t t t t t t t
t t t t
t
[r (n 1) / n (1 ) ]((n 1) / n ) ˆc (n 1) c (n 1) c
 − −ϕ γ − ε µ −
> − = =  α 
. 
